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Abstract
High dynamic range (HDR) imaging enables to capture the full range of physical
luminance of a real-world scene, and is expected to progressively replace tra-
ditional low dynamic range (LDR) pictures and videos. Despite the increasing
HDR popularity, very little attention has been devoted to new forensic prob-
lems that are characteristic to this content. In this paper, we address for the
first time such kind of problem, by identifying the source of an HDR picture.
Specifically, we consider the two currently most common techniques to generate
an HDR image: by fusing multiple LDR images with different exposure time, or
by inverse tone mapping an LDR picture. We show that, in order to apply con-
ventional forensic tools to HDR images, they need to be properly preprocessed,
and we propose and evaluate a few simple HDR forensic preprocessing strategies
for this purpose. In addition, we propose a new forensic feature based on Fisher
scores, calculated under Gaussian mixture models. We show that the proposed
feature outperforms the popular SPAM features in classifying the HDR image
source on image blocks as small as 3×3 pixels, which makes our method suitable
to detect composite forgeries combining HDR patches originating from different
acquisition processes.
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1. Introduction
One key limitation of conventional 8-bit image representations is that the
range of luminance available in the physical world substantially exceeds the
dynamic range handled by traditional imaging pipelines, resulting in a loss of
visual information in over/under-exposed image regions. This bottleneck was5
initially recognized and studied in computer graphics [1, 2, 3], leading to the
development of high dynamic range (HDR) formats capable of storing the phys-
ical luminance of a scene (expressed in cd/m2) in high bit-depth, floating-point
formats. More recently, HDR image and video formats have been popularized
in multimedia applications [4], thanks to the increasing availability of HDR10
cameras and displays, as well as content compression standards [5, 6]. Current
trends in multimedia technology, such as the diffusion of Ultra High Definition
Television [7], seem to suggest that the HDR paradigm will progressively replace
conventional low dynamic range (LDR) imaging [8].
While one can reasonably expect that native HDR sensors will become avail-15
able at low cost in the next coming years, nowadays the two most common
techniques to generate HDR content include: 1) acquiring multiple conventional
LDR pictures of the scene at different exposure times, which can be fused to-
gether afterwards using, e.g., the method in [1]. We will refer to HDR pictures
generated in this way as mHDR; 2) acquiring an LDR picture of the scene, and20
expanding its dynamic range through an operation commonly known as inverse
tone mapping (iTM), since conceptually it does the opposite of tone mapping
algorithms conceived to display HDR pictures on LDR displays [9]. We will re-
fer to this kind of images as iHDR. This latter option is particularly attractive
considering that nowadays the majority of legacy video footage is LDR, and that25
range expansion is needed to display it on next-generation HDR displays [10].
Furthermore, it has been shown that in many cases HDR video obtained through
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iTM yields similar, or even indistinguishable, visual experience as HDR content
generated by multiple exposures [11, 12].
In this work, we consider the forensic problem of identifying whether an HDR30
picture is mHDR or iHDR. From a multimedia security perspective, solving
this forensic problem can help to identify the authenticity of a content, and
to localize tampering whenever mHDR and iHDR image patches have been
composed together to create a forgery. To this end, it is desirable to perform fine-
grained mHDR/iHDR classification to precisely localize the tampered regions35
and infer their semantics consequently [13].
Forensic problems in the context of HDR images have been rarely considered
in the literature. In part, this is due to the only recent development of HDR
imaging in the multimedia and signal processing community; at the same time,
the limited availability of HDR image datasets has somehow constrained forensic40
research in this field; finally, the very same concept of high dynamic range
image format has sometimes been erroneously confused with simply higher bit
depth (sometimes called wider dynamic range), whereas HDR pictures are scene
referred and represent real-world luminance, featuring very different statistical
characteristics compared to LDR images. As a result, only very limited work45
has been done to identify and solve new potential forensic problems associated
to HDR, and when this has been done, it was in the LDR domain, e.g., to
differentiate LDR images from tone-mapped HDR images [14]. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work targeting a forensic problem in the HDR
domain, i.e., analyzing directly HDR pictures in order to identify their source.50
Indeed, in spite of the similarities between HDR and LDR imagery, HDR
image forensics present some subtleties and new challenges with respect to stan-
dard forensic techniques. For instance, while iTM might resemble a contrast
enhancement process, classical forensic detectors based on statistical finger-
prints [15, 16, 17] fail when applied on iHDR pictures, as those images do not55
present typical peak/gap artifacts in their histogram. In fact, the histogram of
the HDR image is not composed by a fixed number of bins, e.g., 28; conversely,
the bin size can be arbitrarily chosen, and the maximum luminance value is
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content dependent. As a result of the continuous nature of HDR values, most
forensic methods based on integer arithmetics, such as classical compression60
and point-wise transformation detectors [18, 19, 16] are not applicable. More
sophisticated forensic tools, which employ higher-order statistics to model local
image content [20, 21], are based on comparing neighboring pixel values as if
they were lying on a uniform interval scale. While this is a reasonable assump-
tion in the case of LDR pixels, we show in this paper that HDR images need to65
be preprocessed through a non-linear transformation in order for these forensic
tools to provide acceptable results. This confirms previous findings in HDR
image quality assessment [22, 23] and in local feature extraction from HDR
pictures [24, 25].
Though as an extension of our preliminary work [26], this paper departs70
from [26] on the following four aspects. 1) A comprehensive study is carried out
for HDR image preprocessing, covering different strategies and parameters. 2)
Instead of 8-bit representation, we consider a much more challenging case when
iHDR images are obtained from high bit-depth RAW LDR images with 16 bits
integer precision. 3) We provide an in-depth study of inverse tone mapping75
detection on very small image blocks, including the smallest possible size 3× 3.
4) The number of selected inverse tone mapping algorithms has increased from
3 to 6. In all, as the first work addressing HDR image forensics, we have made
the following contributions to differentiate mHDR and iHDR images:
• As a starting point, we consider the peculiarities of HDR content com-80
pared to LDR images, from a forensic perspective. We introduce and
motivate some basic preprocessing steps that must be applied to HDR
content in order to extract meaningful forensic features. Differently from
preprocessing approaches proposed in other fields of HDR imaging such
as quality evaluation and compression [22, 27], the preprocessing tech-85
niques considered in this work are specifically designed and evaluated to
maximize forensic classification accuracy rather than perceptual fidelity.
• Based on the analysis of joint histograms of mHDR and iHDR images,
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we observe that features describing higher-order statistics of local im-
age patches are necessary to differentiate mHDR from iHDR. Based on90
this observation, we propose an HDR image forensic feature based on the
Fisher scores [28, 29] calculated under parametric Gaussian mixture mod-
els (GMMs). Our approach is to some extent inspired by a texture/facial
analysis feature [30, 31], which however has never been applied in a forensic
scenario. We show that our feature can outperform the popular Subtrac-95
tive Pixel Adjacency Matrix (SPAM) features [20] in mHDR and iHDR
image classification.
• In order to address the problem of fine-grained mHDR/iHDR classification
for, e.g., tampering localization, we conduct an experimental study using
image blocks with very small sizes, including the challenging case of 3 ×100
3 image blocks. This shows that the proposed forensic algorithm has
a practical value in detecting composition forgeries including iHDR and
mHDR content.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 briefly reviews the
mHDR image creation and six iTM methods. In Sec. 3, we compare LDR and105
HDR image representations from a forensic point of view, and propose four
simple strategies to pre-process an HDR image in order to effectively extract
forensic features. The proposed method based on Fisher scores and GMMs is
presented in Sec. 4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. 6.
2. Background110
In this paper, we consider a new image forensic problem on HDR content:
differentiating an HDR image created from the fusion of multiple LDR images
(i.e., mHDR) from one created through inverse tone mapping of a single LDR
image (i.e., iHDR). In this section we briefly describe how these two types of
images are created.115
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2.1. mHDR image creation
The most popular way to create HDR images is by combining pictures taken
from a conventional LDR camera [1, 32], using multiple LDR photos of the same
scene captured with different exposure times. For each captured image, pixel
values are modeled as a non-linear camera response function of the exposure.120
The exposure is further modeled as the multiplication of the scene luminance
(to be estimated), and the exposure time (assumed to be known). Therefore,
the camera response function and the luminance of the scene can be jointly
estimated, e.g., by minimizing the squared error between the camera response
and the pixel values measured at the different exposure times. The estimated125
luminance map constitutes the resulting mHDR image.
2.2. iHDR image creation
The dynamic range of an LDR picture can be expanded to match that of
an HDR display by iTM operators. Compared to mHDR images, iHDR images
created by iTM operators do not represent the physical luminance of the scene,130
but rather aim at expanding the dynamics of the LDR image in such a way to
reproduce the visceral response associated to the original scene [33]. Subjective
studies have shown that, with a well-exposed LDR image and a proper iTM
operator, iHDR images can be visually as appealing as mHDR pictures, and
thus difficult to distinguish from the latter ones at naked eye [12, 11]. This135
motivates the study of forensic techniques to computationally assess whether
an HDR image is iHDR or mHDR.
In this paper, we select six popular inverse tone mapping algorithms for
creating the iHDR images, described in the following.
1) In Akyu¨z et al.’s method [11], denoted by ‘A’, the input LDR content is140
firstly linearized and then linearly scaled to achieve the desired dynamic range
(typically the one of the HDR displaying device). Akyu¨z et al. show that this
method works well with well-exposed content without compression artifacts.
2) Banterle et al.’s method [34, 35], denoted by ‘B’, expands content by
applying the inverse of a sigmoid [36]. To reduce artifacts due to quantization145
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and to try to reconstruct the lost signal, an expanded image is blended with
the original one using an expand map, i.e., a smooth field that guides expan-
sion based on importance sampling. The method works well when images are
moderately saturated [9] and is temporally stable [35].
3) Huo et al.’s method [37], denoted by ‘H’, uses a non-linear sigmoid-like150
function in order to increase the dynamic range of the input LDR content only
in specific regions of the image, indicated by an expand map. The method is
computationally fast (using an approximated bilateral filter), temporally stable,
and is able to achieve quality results on moderately over-exposed content.
4) Kovaleski and Oliveira’s method [38], denoted by ‘K’, linearly expands155
the input LDR content to a desired dynamic range only in certain regions of
the image using an expand map, which is computed using thresholding on the
luminance channel followed by bilateral filtering. As in Huo et al.’s operator
[37], the method is computationally fast, temporally stable, and it can achieve
quality results on moderately over-exposed content.160
5)Meylan et al.’s method [39], denoted by ‘M’, applies different linear expan-
sions in different areas of the image, which are classified as diffuse or specular.
Classification is based on simple thresholding. Filtering is employed to reduce
contour artifacts that may appear in areas between a diffuse and a specular area.
The method is straightforward to implement and fast, but it is not temporally165
coherent because thresholding depends on the processed image.
6) Rempel et al.’s method [33], denoted by ‘R’, linearly expands the input
LDR content to a desired dynamic range only in certain regions of the image
using an expand map, which is obtained using an edge-stop function computed in
a multi-resolution fashion. This method is computationally fast and temporally170
stable. The method can typically produce high quality results on moderately
over-exposed content.
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3. Image Forensics: from LDR to HDR
The existing abundant literature on image forensics mainly deals with con-
ventional, 8-bit LDR representation per pixel per color channel. A natural ques-175
tion arises about whether these forensic techniques might be applied to HDR
content, and which kinds of precautions and caveats should be considered while
doing so. In this section, we start by discussing some fundamental differences
between HDR and LDR images, which are often misunderstood or confused.
Afterwards, we consider the illustrative case of a popular steganalytic/forensic180
feature, SPAM [20], and study its applicability in the case of HDR image.
3.1. Differences between HDR and LDR Image Representations
A common interpretation of HDR images is that those are the higher bit-
depth version of LDR pictures, e.g., being 16 or more bits per pixel and per
channel. However, the difference with LDR is conceptually deeper.185
LDR images are device-referred or output-referred, i.e., pixel values repre-
sent color to be displayed on a monitor or paper print. Since perceived lumi-
nance is a nonlinear function of physical light, LDR pixels are perceptually en-
coded using the sRGB non-linearity [40], commonly approximated as a “gamma-
correction” function (with the typical gamma value of 2.2). This gamma correc-190
tion, which was historically introduced to compensate for the typical response
of legacy CRT displays, actually describes quite accurately the loss of sensitiv-
ity of the human visual system at low luminance levels. Due to this nonlinear
compression, it is possible to represent images to be reproduced on typical LDR
displays using 8 bits per pixel per color channel. 16-bit representations are also195
becoming popular, e.g., as the RAW output of many digital cameras. Further-
more, pixel values in LDR images are approximately perceptually uniform, i.e.,
a difference of 1 pixel value has approximately the same perceptual magnitude
independently of the baseline value on which the difference is computed. As a
result, arithmetic operations on LDR pixels are perceptually meaningful. More-200
over, due to this perceptual uniformity, a well-contrasted LDR picture has pixel
values that span the full range of available codewords (e.g., 0− 255).
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On the other hand, HDR images are scene-referred, i.e., pixel values store (or
are proportional to) the physical luminance of the scene, measured in cd/m2. As
mentioned above, real-world luminance may span several orders of magnitude,205
from as low as 10−6 cd/m2 for very dim scenes, up to 108 cd/m2 for direct
sunlight in a sunny day. In order to accurately represent this wide range, HDR
image formats such as OpenEXR [41] or RGBE [2] typically use floating point
pixel values. Hence, differently from the LDR case, HDR pixels do not take
values on a fixed interval, i.e., the minimum and maximum pixel values are210
arbitrary and can be very different across images. Furthermore, the typical
histogram of an HDR image is highly skewed, with most pixels concentrated in
a very small range, but with possibly very long tails due to bright details at high
luminance. Finally, due to the highly nonlinear human perception of brightness,
in order to perform perceptually meaningful arithmetic operations on HDR pixel215
values, these need to be previously encoded in a similar way as in the case of
the gamma correction [22]. Different encoding functions have been proposed in
the past few years, including the popular SMPTE 2084 electro-optical transfer
function [27].
3.2. Benchmark Feature: SPAM220
One of the contributions of this paper is to investigate how a typical foren-
sic feature performs for a novel problem in the context of HDR images. To
this end, we consider the well-known steganalytic/forensic feature SPAM (Sub-
tractive Pixel Adjacency Matrix) [20]. In LDR image forensics literature, it
has shown excellent performance in detecting various image operations such225
as JPEG compression [42], median filtering [43], and image sharpening [13].
We choose to compare with the SPAM feature instead of the well-known SRM
(34671-dimensional) feature [21] because of the following two reasons. Firstly,
the SPAM feature can be taken as a subset of the SRM feature [21]. Secondly,
we are interested in forensic detection of image blocks as small as 3× 3, whose230
high-dimensional SRM feature may contain lots of redundancy.
The SPAM feature was designed for 8-bit grayscale images. It models the
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image derivatives using the first-order and second-order Markov chains. In this
paper, we consider the widely used second-order SPAM feature, which is 686-
dimensional. Clearly, as mentioned in Section 3, computing differences between235
photometric pixel values might not be appropriate, e.g., these differences might
be dominated by very bright pixels. Hence, it is reasonable to apply some com-
pressive encoding (such as a logarithm) before computing the forensic feature.
In Sec. 5, we will provide relevant experimental comparisons between the SPAM
feature and the proposed method.240
3.3. HDR Image Preprocessing
Straightforwardly, it is not possible to directly extract the SPAM feature
from an HDR image given its floating point representation and largely varying
pixel value range. In fact, this can bias the extraction of the 686-dimensional
second-order SPAM feature as it only counts small image derivatives with val-245
ues in {−3,−2, · · · , 3}. For this problem, HDR image pixel values should be
scaled and rounded so that the SPAM feature can be properly extracted. In the
following, we consider four simple scaling and rounding strategies, which will
then be compared experimentally in Section 5.2.
Without loss of generality, we only consider the luminance component of250
a given HDR image, which is also where most iTM methods carry out the
dynamic range expansion. Given an HDR image of size H ×W , its luminance
component is extracted and linearly scaled to [0, 1] to obtain the matrix L. A
simple scaling strategy can be based on the maximum pixel value, which is equal
to 1 for L. However, this does not take into account that different HDR images255
may capture scenes with very different dynamic ranges. In order to compensate
for this factor, we can scale the image based on the average brightness. To
this end, we adopt the image key which indicates whether the captured scene
is subjectively light, normal, or dark [36]. This can be approximated as the
exponential of the log-average luminance of the image:260
K = exp

 1
H ×W
∑
i,j
log (Li,j + ǫ)

 , (1)
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where Li,j denotes the value of the (i, j)-th pixel (1 ≤ i ≤ H, 1 ≤ j ≤ W ), and
we set ǫ = 10−6 to avoid the singularity when taking the logarithm. Notice
that Eq. (1) corresponds to computing the geometric mean of the image, which
is intuitively appropriate given the highly skewed distribution of HDR pixels.
Based on either the maximum value 1 or the image key K calculated adaptively265
according to each image, we thereafter propose the following two image scaling
strategies:
Llini,j = (2
b − 1)Li,j , (2)
and
L
keylin
i,j = (2
b − 1)
Li,j
K
, (3)
where b is an arbitrary non-negative parameter. The value of b decides the range
of pixel values after scaling, which affects the population of image derivatives in270
{−3,−2, · · · , 3} considered by the SPAM feature [20]. We will experimentally
study its impact on the forensic performance in Sec. 5.2.
In the study of HDR image statistics, it is a common practice to analyze the
image after taking the logarithm [44]. Accordingly, we propose the two following
strategies to scale the HDR image in the logarithmic domain:275
L
log
i,j = (2
b − 1)
log(Li,j + ǫ)− log(ǫ)
log(1 + ǫ)− log(ǫ)
, (4)
and
L
keylog
i,j = (2
b − 1)
log(Li,j + ǫ)− log(ǫ)
log(K + ǫ)− log(ǫ)
, (5)
respectively based on the maximum pixel value and the image key. After the
HDR image is preprocessed following either Eq. (2), (3), (4), or (5), the pixel
values are rounded to integers in order to extract the SPAM feature.
In order to extract the proposed forensic feature (to be detailed in the next280
section), we also consider the four preprocessing strategies as for SPAM features.
However, our method does not require integer pixels. Thus, no rounding is
applied after Eqs. (2)-(5) for the extraction of our feature.
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4. Forensic Analysis Based on Fisher Scores
4.1. Preliminary Analysis285
In order to discriminate iHDR and mHDR images, a key observation is that
iHDR pictures are obtained from an LDR signal, which has a discrete nature.
For 8-bit representation LDR images with pixel values in a limited integer set
{0, 1, · · · , 255}, though after inverse tone mapping the pixel values are converted
to floating point numbers, the discreteness of pixel values still exist in the iHDR290
images. In order to explore these statistics, we analyze the joint probability
or co-occurrence matrix of neighboring pixels [20, 45]. When constructing the
joint histogram with a sufficiently big number of bins, e.g., 512, such intrinsic
differences between mHDR and iHDR images can be exposed.
Fig. 1 reports the joint histogram of horizontally adjacent pixels of the lu-295
minance component in some HDR images (refer to the electronic version for
a better visibility). Differently from the mHDR images, we can observe that
gaps/peaks exist in the joint histograms of iHDR images, as shown in Fig. 1-(b),
-(d), -(f), -(h), -(j), and -(l). To compactly describe the above mentioned joint
histogram characteristic, we can use, e.g., Fourier analysis. In our preliminary300
tests, this provided us around 85% of iHDR image detection accuracy, indicating
that such second-order statistics may be only partially effective [26]. In addi-
tion, many digital cameras can also output 16-bit RAW pictures, that could be
used as input for an iTM algorithm. In this case, the differences in second-order
statistics of pixel values might be too small to be accurately detected, as shown305
in Fig. 1-(c), -(e), -(g), -(i), -(k), and -(m), where we can no longer observe
gaps/peaks in the joint histogram. This suggests that second-order statistics
might be insufficient to solve, with acceptable generality, the forensic problem
of discriminating iHDR from mHDR. Therefore, we resort to a more powerful
feature, based on higher-order statistics, which provides a richer description of310
inter-pixel dependencies.
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(a) mHDR
(b) iHDR, ‘A’, 8-bit (c) iHDR, ‘A’, 16-bit (d) iHDR, ‘B’, 8-bit (e) iHDR, ‘B’, 16-bit
(f) iHDR, ‘H’, 8-bit (g) iHDR, ‘H’, 16-bit (h) iHDR, ‘K’, 8-bit (i) iHDR, ‘K’, 16-bit
(j) iHDR, ‘M’, 8-bit (k) iHDR, ‘M’, 16-bit (l) iHDR, ‘R’, 8-bit (m) iHDR, ‘R’, 16-bit
Figure 1: Example joint histograms of mHDR/iHDR images in the logarithmic domain. The
same scene was captured in the mHDR image and in the LDR image which was used for cre-
ating the iHDR images [11, 39, 33, 35, 37, 38]. The corresponding LDR image for creating the
iHDR images whose joint histograms are shown in (b), (d), (f), (h), (j), and (l) is represented
with 8 bits for each color channel. Whereas the corresponding LDR image for (c), (e), (g),
(i), (k), and (m) is represented with 16 bits for each color channel. For a better visibility, we
have taken logarithm of the joint histogram and afterwards carried out a normalization.
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4.2. Forensic Analysis Based on Fisher Scores
Motivated by the preliminary analysis of mHDR/iHDR images in Sec. 4.1,
here we study the local higher-order image statistics after the given HDR im-
age is pre-processed as described in Sec. 3.3. Given a generic pixel z0 and315
its s × s local neighborhood {z1, z2, · · · , zs2−1}, we obtain a local differen-
tial vector x with xi = zi − z0 (i = 1, 2, · · · , s
2 − 1). Its log-likelihood un-
der an M -component Gaussian mixture model (GMM) parametrized by θ =
{πi,µi, (Ci)−1|i = 1, 2, · · · ,M} is computed as:
L(θ|x) = p(x|θ) =
M∑
i=1
πiN (x|µi,Ci), (6)
where πi, µi, and Ci are respectively the mixing weight, mean, and covariance320
matrix of the i-th GMM component. The higher-order statistics in the local
neighborhood of z0 can therefore be represented using the Fisher scores [28],
which are calculated as the partial derivatives with respect to the parameters θ
of the log-likelihood L(θ|x), i.e., ∇θ log L(θ|x). More specifically, the partial
derivatives with respect to πi and (Ci)−1 are calculated as:325
∂ log L(θ|x)
∂ πi
=
N (x|µi,Ci)
L(θ|x)
, (7)
∂ log L(θ|x)
∂ (Ci)−1
=
πiN (x|µi,Ci)
2L(θ|x)
(
Ci − (x− µi)(x− µi)T
)
. (8)
For the sake of simplicity and also for reducing the dimensionality of the final
forensic feature, we only consider the diagonal elements of (Ci)−1 for computing
the Fisher scores. Therefore, we have a Fisher score vector F(θ,x), with length
M + (s2 − 1)M = s2M .330
In practice, we compute the Fisher scores with respect to two 0-mean GMMs,
parametrized by θ0 and θ1, representing mHDR and iHDR, respectively. The
two GMMs are learned in a previous, off-line training stage from a database
containing the two classes of HDR images, using the Expectation-Maximization
algorithm. The reason why we employ 0-mean GMMs is that x captures the335
local derivatives of z, which carry high-frequency information, and thus the
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trained means µi are generally close to zero. Therefore, we remove the DC
component and train 0-mean GMMs for both image classes, as is usually done
in natural image modeling [46] and image forensics/anti-forensics [13, 47]. Given
x, we then can form the following 2s2M × 1 sized Fisher score vector:340
f˜(x) =
[
F(θ0,x)T ,F(θ1,x)T
]T
, (9)
which is further normalized [29, 30, 31] to construct the proposed forensic feature
vector with the i-th element as:
fi(x) = sign
(
f˜i(x)
) ∣∣f˜i(x)
∣∣1/2
∑
i
∣∣f˜i(x)
∣∣ , i = 1, 2, · · · , 2s
2M. (10)
In the LDR image analysis literature, the concept of Fisher scores [28] has
largely influenced image classification in the form of the well-known Fisher vec-
tor [29], which further inspired the recently proposed LHS feature [30, 31] in345
texture/facial analysis. We use for the first time Fisher scores [28] in the pro-
posed method for HDR image forensic purposes. We will show in Sec. 5.3 with
experimental evidence that the proposed method outperforms the LHS feature.
Though sharing the same basis of the Fisher vector, the proposed feature departs
from the LHS feature on the following three points.350
• For the proposed feature, the partial derivatives with respect to pii and
(Ci)−1 are calculated under 0-mean GMMs, whereas for the LHS fea-
ture [30, 31], the partial derivatives with respect to µi and (Ci)−1 are
calculated using non-0-mean GMMs. For a fair comparison, we tried to
extract the LHS feature using 0-mean GMMs. This modified LHS feature355
turned out to perform worse than the original LHS feature (around 4%
lower detection accuracy on 8 × 8 image blocks). Therefore, we use the
original LHS formulation for comparison with the proposed feature.
• After the partial derivative calculation and before the normalization in
Eq. (10), a necessary normalization based on the mean and variance of360
the Fisher scores calculated on the training differential vectors is included
in the construction of the LHS feature [30, 31]. However, for the proposed
feature, we do not include such a procedure.
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• Furthermore, differently from the LHS feature using a single GMM, the
proposed method includes two GMMs for forensic analysis. The two365
GMMs, which respectively model mHDR images and iHDR images, pro-
vide information on both types of images. This enables the proposed
feature to better distinguish between mHDR images and iHDR images
than the LHS feature.
For a given HDR image preprocessed as described in Sec. 3.3, overlapping370
s × s image patches are extracted. Then, the DC component of the computed
local differential vectors are removed. Afterwards, their corresponding Fisher
score vectors are respectively computed according to Eq. (9). For extracting the
proposed forensic feature vector of a given image, these Fisher score vectors are
averaged before normalization as in Eq. (10).375
Note that the Fisher score vectors are extracted and then averaged from
s×s patches of a given image. Thus, for a given block size s, the feature dimen-
sionality remains the same independently from the original image dimension.
At the same time, this grants the proposed forensic feature the ability to work
on image blocks as small as s × s. In [48, 31], it is shown that the statistics380
calculated on image patches as small as 3 × 3 are capable of achieving good
classification results. Besides, a small value of s can help to reduce the dimen-
sionality of the feature vector. Therefore, we set s = 3 in this paper, and we
learn one GMM from each type (mHDR, and six iHDR types: ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘H’,
‘K’, ‘M’, and ‘R’) from 3 × 3 HDR image patches. We compare the proposed385
method with the SPAM feature, which is 686-dimensional. Therefore, we learn
GMMs with M = 38 components, so that the proposed forensic feature is com-
parably 684-dimensional. Likewise, we learn a GMM with M = 43 components
for extracting the 688-dimensional LHS feature [30, 31]. Further in Sec. 5.3, we
will also study how the number of GMM component M impacts the forensic390
performance of the proposed method.
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5. Experimental Results
5.1. Experimental Setting
Currently, there is no large mHDR image dataset available in the literature.
In order to conduct our forensic tests, we therefore collected 498 high-resolution395
mHDR images from the following 8 sources:
• EmpaMT dataset [49] includes 33 mHDR images;
• Meylan created 14 mHDR images [50];
• Fairchild created 106 mHDR images [51];
• HDRSID dataset [52] includes 232 mHDR images;400
• IRCCyN-IVC dataset contains 10 mHDR images1;
• Mantiuk created 8 mHDR images [53];
• Stanford dataset [54] is with 88 mHDR images;
• Ward created 7 mHDR images2.
In order to avoid any possible intervention or postprocessing, we keep the down-405
loaded mHDR images as they were. We rely on their authors to have adopted
possible strategies [55] to create the best possible mHDR images. Our collection
of downloaded mHDR images is a diverse mHDR image dataset, with images
from various resources. To keep the diversity, we do not impose any mHDR
image selection. In particular, we keep the mHDR images with ghosting arti-410
facts3 [56]. This dataset diversity can help us to better validate the robustness
of forensic features.
1We downloaded these images from: http://ivc.univ-nantes.fr/en/databases/ETHyma/
and http://ivc.univ-nantes.fr/en/databases/JPEG_HDR_Images/ with duplicates removed.
2Included in: http://www.cs.utah.edu/~reinhard/cdrom/hdr/.
3Two example HDR images can be found here: http://rit-mcsl.org/fairchild/
HDRPS/Scenes/Peppermill.html and http://rit-mcsl.org/fairchild/HDRPS/Scenes/
BarHarborPresunrise.html.
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Among the above mentioned 8 mHDR image sources, EmpaMT dataset and
Meylan provide some original LDR images (sequences). From these two sources,
we have 33+7 = 40 well-exposed LDR images. Among them, 3 images are 24-bit415
RGB images in JPEG format, and the others are in RAW format. Each of these
LDR images corresponds to one mHDR image. For the remaining 498−40 = 458
mHDR images, we have no access to the original LDR image sequences. As a
supplement, we randomly pick 458 images from another LDR image dataset
“mitadobe5k” [57], which contains 5000 high-quality images stored in RAW420
format, initially used for the study of photographic global tonal adjustment.
We find these LDR images especially suitable here, as their high quality ensures
the creation of visually appealing iHDR images. The mHDR and LDR images
are with a good diversity of scenes and cameras, which is important for reliable
forensic analysis.425
In our experiments, most of the LDR images in use are in the RAW format
and only 3 out of 498 images are 24-bit RGB images in JPEG format. In our
previous work [26], all the RAW LDR images are firstly read out to 24-bit RGB
images before they are used by the inverse tone mapping algorithms to create
the iHDR images. In this paper, we consider a more challenging case. We430
read out 16-bit pixel values from each color channel of the RAW images, then
they are used to create the iHDR images. This makes the forensic detection of
inverse tone mapping a much harder problem, compared to the setting in our
previous work in [26]. From the results reported in this section, we can see that
the performance of all the three forensic features, i.e., SPAM [20], LHS [30, 31],435
and the proposed, decreases, if we compare with the results reported in our
previous work [26]. But we will show that the new results still confirm that it
is promising to perform HDR image forensics via analysis of high-order image
statistics using the proposed method as well as the SPAM/LHS features.
For each LDR image in our dataset, we create iHDR images ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘H’,440
‘K’, ‘M’, and ‘R’, with the six iTM algorithms [11, 39, 33, 35, 37, 38] described
in Sec. 2.2. These mHDR and iHDR images are randomly divided into a training
and a test set, both containing 249 mHDR images, and 249 iHDR images of each
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type (‘A’, ‘B’, ‘H’, ‘K’, ‘M’, and ‘R’). We also made sure that if iHDR images,
created from one LDR image which comes from EmpaMT dataset or Meylan,445
are in one set, the corresponding mHDR image is also included in the same set.
Here, we choose to run forensic tests on cropped 512×512 sub-images instead
of the high-resolution HDR images. This is partly because of the use of machine
learning methods, e.g., SVM (Support Vector Machine), which is a common
practice in image forensics. In this context, a sufficient number of image samples450
is required to avoid the curse of dimensionality. We also need enough image
samples to show the statistical significance of the tests. Though not directly
testing on high-resolution images, the proposed experimental setting is very
suitable to assess forensic methods. Even for high-resolution image classification
under the setting of 512× 512 image size, one possible way could be to simply455
divide the image into overlapping/non-overlapping 512 × 512 sub-images; the
final output can then be obtained by fusing the decisions on the sub-images,
e.g., by majority voting.
Based on the above considerations, we cropped (at most) 9 adjacent sub-
images of size 512 × 512 from the center of each high-resolution mHDR/iHDR460
image. In order to keep the number of cropped 512 × 512 mHDR images and
that of iHDR images of each type the same, a few 512 × 512 iHDR images
created from mitadobe5k LDR images were randomly picked and removed. In
the end, we had 1851 mHDR images and 1851 iHDR images of size 512×512 in
the testing dataset HDRFTE (HDR Forensic TEsting). In the training dataset465
HDRFTR (HDR Forensic TRaining), there are 1839 mHDR images and 1839
iHDR images sized 512× 512.
Besides 512×512 images, we also choose to test on very small image blocks.
More specifically, we consider image blocks with sizes 8×8, 7×7, 6×6, 5×5, 4×4,
and even 3× 3. Such tests can be taken as equivalent to fine-grained tampering470
localization [13], and they are very important for assessing the forensic perfor-
mance of different features. From each mHDR/iHDR image, one image block
is cropped randomly from each image from the HDRFTR dataset, whereas five
image blocks from random locations are cropped from images in the HDRFTE
19
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Figure 2: Detection accuracy comparison for different HDR image preprocessing strategies
with different parameters. The experimental study is carried out on 8 × 8 image blocks
of mHDR and ‘mix’ iHDR images. The training of the detectors is performed on HDRFTR
dataset, while the accuracies are obtained from HDRFTE dataset. The legends ‘lin’, ‘keylin’,
‘log’, and ‘keylog’ respectively correspond to the HDR image scaling strategies formulated
in Eqs. (2), (3), (4), and (5), by substituting b with bs or bl.
dataset. Therefore, for each HDR image forensic problem classifying small im-475
age blocks, we had 1839 × 1 = 1839 blocks from each class for training the
detector, and 1851 × 5 = 9255 blocks from each class for testing to obtain the
detection accuracies.
As described in Sec. 2.2, we have six types of iHDR images ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘H’, ‘K’,
‘M’, and ‘R’. Besides, we also consider another class with mixed iHDR images480
randomly selected from the previously mentioned six types of iHDR images, and
we denote it as ‘mix’. For each class of mHDR/iHDR images, 50 image patches
with size 3 × 3 are randomly selected from each image in the training dataset
HDRFTR. Therefore, we have 1839 × 50 = 91950 image patches to learn a
GMM. For each image (block) size and each type of iHDR image, 1839×2 = 3678485
image (block) samples from dataset HDRFTR are used for training the detector,
whereas 1851 × 2 = 3702 image samples or 1851 × 5 × 2 = 18510 image block
samples from dataset HDRFTE are used to evaluate the forensic performance.
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Table 1: Detection accuracy (%) comparison of different forensic detectors on 8 × 8 image
blocks, when different HDR image preprocessing strategies are used. The bs and bl values are
selected according to the results shown in Fig. 2. The feature dimensionalities of the SPAM
feature and the proposed feature are respectively 686 and 684. Forensic detectors are trained
on dataset HDRFTR. Results are obtained on dataset HDRFTE.
mix A B H K M R
‘lin’
bs = 14, bl = 6
SPAM 69.17 74.94 67.44 68.99 74.66 71.93 70.41
Proposed 70.68 75.34 69.88 66.86 75.69 71.10 67.37
‘keylin’
bs = 5, bl = log2(2)
SPAM 72.84 74.97 68.06 72.39 75.01 75.11 76.18
Proposed 75.21 76.37 72.02 73.92 76.44 76.65 77.36
‘log’
bs = 9, bl = 4
SPAM 73.56 74.37 71.01 73.75 74.15 74.31 79.76
Proposed 76.45 76.70 75.55 76.21 76.59 76.37 81.24
‘keylog’
bs = 9, bl = 6
SPAM 72.72 73.39 70.24 72.77 73.46 73.71 78.60
Proposed 76.25 75.93 75.25 74.88 75.55 75.55 81.90
5.2. HDR Image Preprocessing
In this section, we will experimentally study and compare the impact of dif-490
ferent HDR image preprocessing strategies we proposed in Sec. 3.3 on mHDR/iHDR
classification accuracy. Here, we use ‘lin’, ‘keylin’, ‘log’, and ‘keylog’ to re-
fer to the HDR image scaling strategies formulated in Eqs. (2), (3), (4), and
(5), respectively. For both the SPAM feature [20] (also see Sec. 3.2) and the
proposed method, we test different values of b to pre-process the HDR con-495
tent, extract the forensic features, train the forensic detectors, and obtain the
detection accuracies for evaluation.
We perform the experimental study on 8×8 image blocks, since the forensic
performance at this level is more sensible to the quality of the employed feature.
For the sake of conciseness, we report the results of this experiment for the ‘mix’500
iHDR class only, instead of all types of iHDR images separately, as this already
includes all six types of iHDR images we consider in this paper. Fig. 2 shows
the forensic performance variations with varying the b value (see Eqs. (2)-(5))
for the four proposed HDR image preprocessing strategies. In the figures, bs
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and bl respectively denote the b values used for extracting the SPAM feature505
and the proposed feature.
According to Fig. 2, we obtain the best b values for different HDR image
preprocessing strategies. With these values, we extract the SPAM feature and
the proposed feature, and obtain the detection accuracies for other six inverse
tone mapping detection problems, as reported in Table 1. In linear pixel value510
domain (corresponding to ‘lin’ and ‘keylin’), it is interesting to observe that
the scaling based on the image key performs much better than that based on
the maximum value, showing that the very different dynamic ranges of different
HDR images do cause bias in forensic tests. This can be improved by conduct-
ing a scaling based on the image key, which is adaptively estimated from each515
HDR content. Compared to the linear domain, it seems to be more effective to
perform HDR image forensics in the logarithmic domain (corresponding to ‘log’
and ‘keylog’). This can be interpreted by looking at the joint histogram results
shown in Fig. 1. By taking the logarithm, the range of small image pixel values
is expanded and thus makes histograms more distinctive. Statistical differences520
are well exposed in the range with small pixel values, leading to effective forensic
analysis. Also, in this case normalizing by the key does not change significantly
the performance, showing that a logarithmic range compression is already ro-
bust enough to cope with the content-dependent dynamic range of each image.
Therefore, we choose to use in the rest of the experiments the ‘log’ HDR image525
preprocessing strategy for both the SPAM feature and the proposed method,
with bs = 9 for the SPAM feature and bl = 4 for the proposed feature.
5.3. Forensic Performance Evaluation
Using the ‘log’ preprocessing strategy as discussed in Sec. 5.2, we report
in Table 2 the forensic performance of the proposed method with comparisons530
to the SPAM feature [20] and the LHS feature [30, 31]. To better validate the
efficacy of the proposed feature. We also carry out the forensic detection in
the following two scenarios: 1) HDR images with relatively low dynamic range,
and 2) HDR images with relatively high dynamic range. For each HDR image,
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Table 2: Detection accuracy (%) comparison when different image (block) sizes are considered.
The feature dimensionalities of the SPAM feature, the LHS feature, and the proposed feature
are respectively 686, 688, and 684. Forensic detectors are trained on dataset HDRFTR.
Results are obtained on dataset HDRFTE.
‘mix’ ‘A’ ‘B’ ‘H’ ‘K’ ‘M’ ‘R’
512× 512
SPAM 97.19 97.16 96.92 97.08 97.14 97.00 97.92
LHS 94.68 94.79 96.38 95.14 94.95 95.11 96.81
Proposed 94.35 93.84 97.11 94.06 94.38 94.81 97.27
8× 8
SPAM 73.56 74.37 71.01 73.75 74.15 74.31 79.76
LHS 72.98 73.75 69.69 71.49 73.52 73.76 77.88
Proposed 76.45 76.70 75.55 76.21 76.59 76.37 81.24
7× 7
SPAM 71.39 72.25 68.07 71.26 72.37 72.36 78.36
LHS 70.12 71.66 68.26 70.57 71.11 71.40 76.48
Proposed 74.67 74.99 73.95 74.20 74.79 74.86 80.32
6× 6
SPAM 69.68 70.96 66.35 70.21 70.43 70.93 75.88
LHS 69.12 70.54 66.08 69.69 70.61 70.15 75.63
Proposed 72.70 73.33 71.87 72.01 73.01 73.12 78.22
5× 5
SPAM 67.10 68.25 63.24 67.26 68.17 68.50 74.23
LHS 67.72 68.21 64.05 67.09 68.81 67.88 72.81
Proposed 70.82 71.16 68.64 70.68 71.38 71.36 76.52
4× 4
SPAM 63.06 63.97 59.22 63.11 63.87 64.41 69.76
LHS 64.67 65.09 60.32 64.49 65.19 65.60 69.98
Proposed 67.50 67.71 64.67 67.25 67.55 67.91 73.88
3× 3
SPAM - - - - - - -
LHS 62.28 64.02 58.66 62.59 63.82 63.76 68.93
Proposed 63.66 64.89 60.44 63.92 64.79 64.63 70.51
after excluding the biggest 0.01% and smallest 0.01% pixels, we can compute535
its dynamic range as the ratio between the biggest and smallest pixel values.
According the dynamic range of each HDR image, we construct the following to
subsets: 1) HDRFTE-L, containing iHDR images with the 20% lowest dynamic
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Table 3: Detection accuracy (%) obtained on dataset HDRFTE-L (iHDR/mHDR images with
the 20% lowest dynamic range).
‘mix’ ‘A’ ‘B’ ‘H’ ‘K’ ‘M’ ‘R’
512× 512
SPAM 98.24 98.11 98.11 98.11 97.97 98.51 98.38
LHS 95.54 95.95 96.62 97.30 96.08 96.89 97.57
Proposed 95.41 93.51 96.49 94.05 93.92 95.14 96.08
8× 8
SPAM 75.22 75.73 71.59 74.32 75.46 77.00 79.30
LHS 75.92 74.95 70.70 72.30 75.24 76.32 78.76
Proposed 80.30 79.54 77.62 78.41 79.14 79.24 81.54
7× 7
SPAM 72.57 73.14 68.24 72.54 73.57 75.46 78.00
LHS 73.41 73.76 70.16 73.05 73.41 74.59 77.05
Proposed 77.95 77.68 75.41 75.92 77.65 78.22 81.35
6× 6
SPAM 72.51 73.49 66.68 71.78 73.41 74.32 76.35
LHS 71.97 72.84 68.24 71.67 72.62 72.78 76.57
Proposed 76.38 75.14 73.70 73.32 74.81 76.27 78.81
5× 5
SPAM 69.35 69.86 63.24 67.95 69.51 70.46 73.95
LHS 69.43 69.03 65.22 68.16 69.76 70.19 73.30
Proposed 73.11 72.84 69.65 72.03 72.95 73.89 76.22
4× 4
SPAM 65.38 66.70 60.11 65.16 67.05 67.43 70.65
LHS 67.84 68.16 61.16 66.59 68.49 69.46 70.65
Proposed 70.73 70.08 66.24 68.27 69.84 71.70 74.03
3× 3
SPAM - - - - - - -
LHS 65.30 65.32 59.86 63.76 65.38 66.57 68.41
Proposed 65.46 65.43 60.86 64.51 65.89 66.70 69.38
range and mHDR images with the 20% lowest dynamic range, and 2) HDRFTE-
H, containing iHDR images with the 20% highest dynamic range and mHDR540
images with the 20% highest dynamic range. The detection accuracies on these
two subsets are reported in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
For the extraction of both the LHS feature and the proposed feature, we use
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Table 4: Detection accuracy (%) obtained on dataset HDRFTE-H (iHDR/mHDR images with
the 20% highest dynamic range).
‘mix’ ‘A’ ‘B’ ‘H’ ‘K’ ‘M’ ‘R’
512× 512
SPAM 95.95 94.59 93.78 93.92 94.05 94.73 95.68
LHS 93.11 91.22 94.05 91.49 91.08 92.30 96.08
Proposed 92.16 89.19 94.32 90.14 89.73 91.76 97.03
8× 8
SPAM 70.54 69.38 65.05 68.97 68.43 67.73 76.73
LHS 69.38 68.76 62.65 66.35 68.22 68.65 75.84
Proposed 73.51 69.89 68.73 69.95 70.46 69.97 79.46
7× 7
SPAM 68.76 68.57 61.89 67.43 68.41 68.00 77.14
LHS 67.97 67.78 62.97 66.92 66.76 67.05 74.59
Proposed 72.78 69.70 68.27 69.00 70.27 70.38 78.84
6× 6
SPAM 66.86 65.59 60.30 65.57 65.43 66.41 74.54
LHS 65.62 66.32 59.35 65.35 65.87 65.54 74.08
Proposed 70.16 69.22 65.22 67.49 68.35 69.14 7.30
5× 5
SPAM 64.89 64.54 57.78 63.65 64.05 64.49 73.84
LHS 64.97 63.35 58.68 63.14 64.41 64.11 72.27
Proposed 68.76 66.65 61.59 66.54 66.54 68.65 76.16
4× 4
SPAM 60.43 60.41 56.19 60.59 60.05 61.11 70.32
LHS 61.84 61.65 54.65 61.11 61.41 61.51 70.27
Proposed 65.70 64.24 58.27 63.62 63.59 64.08 74.08
3× 3
SPAM - - - - - - -
LHS 60.41 61.51 56.19 60.49 61.35 61.11 69.86
Proposed 62.89 62.92 56.14 62.16 62.35 62.62 72.92
the same setting except the number of components of the GMMs. As described
in the end of Sec. 4.2, we set the local neighborhood size s = 3. Furthermore,545
38-component and 43-component GMMs are used respectively by the proposed
method and the LHS feature, leading to a dimensionality of 684 and 688 re-
spectively. All the forensic detectors are trained on the HDRFTR dataset using
25
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Figure 3: Detection accuracy variation of the proposed method on 8× 8 image blocks, when
GMMs with different numbers of components are used. Forensic detectors are trained on
dataset HDRFTR. Results are obtained on dataset HDRFTE. In general, richer GMMs with
more components bring higher detection accuracies.
SVM [58] with a Gaussian kernel. The parameters of the SVM are searched
using a five-fold cross validation with a multiplication grid as suggested in [20].550
Results reported in Tables 2-4 show the image classification on HDR images
with high dynamic range is a harder problem than those with low dynamic range.
In both cases, the proposed method achieves at least comparable performance
with the SPAM/LHS features, and is especially advantageous on very small
image blocks. Note that, on image blocks as small as 3× 3, the SPAM feature555
cannot even be extracted, as it is not possible to count the co-occurrences of
neighboring second-order derivatives. However, the proposed method can still
perform the forensic task thanks to the fact that the GMMs are learned on 3×3
image patches. Though in such an extreme case the detection accuracies are
much lower than for 512 × 512 images, we believe that these result show the560
boundary achievable by forensic methods when we keep pushing the limits of
image block size. This is very important for the forensic study of very fine-
grained image tampering localization [13].
It is possible to enrich the GMM by learning more components. One in-
teresting question is whether richer GMMs can bring more forensic detector565
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power. In order to answer this question, we study the impact of the number
of GMM components to the forensic performance. Besides the 38-component
GMMs used to construct the 684-dimensional proposed forensic feature, we learn
GMMs with 48, 56, 64, and 72 components. This leads to forensic features with
higher dimensionality, i.e., 864, 1008, 1152, and 1296, respectively. For differ-570
ent iHDR image detections, Fig. 3 shows the detection accuracy variation with
respect to the number of GMM components. We can see that, in general, richer
GMMs with more components can help improve the forensic performance of the
proposed method. Nevertheless, 38-component GMMs seem to be already quite
satisfactory for our HDR image forensic task.575
6. Conclusions
This paper addresses for the first time a new forensic problem in the context
of high dynamic range imaging: differentiating HDR images created from mul-
tiple LDR exposures from those obtained by single LDR images through inverse
tone mapping. We point out in the paper some important and substantial dif-580
ferences between LDR and HDR content, e.g., in terms of the physical meaning
and representation of pixels. This motivates the need to study the applicability
of existing forensic tools to HDR, and to eventually propose new ones. We con-
sider as an example the popular SPAM feature and compare four HDR image
preprocessing strategies to extract it from HDR images. Going one step further,585
we propose a more powerful HDR forensic feature, inspired by the texture/facial
analysis LHS feature, by exploiting local higher-order statistics based on Fisher
scores calculated under GMMs, which achieved especially competitive detection
accuracies on image blocks as small as 3× 3. This is especially significant when
considering a scenario of fine-grained tampering localization. Experimental re-590
sults show that the proposed method performs at least at a comparable level
when compared to the SPAM/LHS feature, and is especially advantageous on
very small image block classification.
As the first image forensics work in HDR content, this paper introduces
27
digital forensics to a new type of image, where various forensic problems can595
be studied. Future research shall be devoted to exploring other relevant foren-
sic problems in HDR images, such as camera fingerprints estimation and anti-
forensics. Furthermore, the proposed feature based on Fisher scores could be
also successfully employed in many conventional LDR forensic problems, in or-
der to push further the possibility of identifying image tampering on very small600
image blocks and gain a better understanding of the semantics of a forgery.
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